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Skirting the Issue: How International Law Fails to
Protect Traditional Cultural Marks from IP Theft
Sonali Maulik*

Abstract
Countries have diferent levels of intellectualproperty (IP)protections. While developed
countries tend to prefer more stringent IP laws, developing countriesprefer weaker ones. With
the enactment of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), which establishedminimum standards of intellectualpropertyrights (IPRs)for states
party, the level of IPRs became much higher globally. However, despite affording strong
protection to many types of IP, this Comment argues that TRIPS fails to provide adequate
protection for traditional cultural marks (TCMs), particularly those used in developing
countries.As a result, companies in developed countries have been able to steal TCMs from
developing countries without violating TRIPS or other internationallaw.
This Comment uses as an example the attempted registration by a UK company of the
word kikoi, the term for a traditionalEastAfrican skirt, to demonstrate that TRIPSfails to
protect this type of IP. With a focus on trademarks and geographical indications this
Comment analyes TRIPS and other laws in the context of traditionalmarks and argues that
currentinternationallaw is inadequatefor the protection of traditionalmarks. It then discusses
proposals to protect traditionalIP and introduces a simple solution to the IP theft of traditional
culturalmarks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2006, the Kikoy UK Company applied for a trademark for the term
kikoy (also spelled kikoi),' a Swahili word for a skirt commonly worn by men in
East Africa.2 The move was notorious in Kenya, whose economy relies on the
production and export of small-scale consumer goods,3 and for whom the kikoi
is a traditional cultural item.4 The UK company withdrew its application for the
trademark due to opposition from a free trade organization,' but it remains
unclear whether the UK Intellectual Property Office would have granted the
trademark.'
I

2

See

Press

Release,

Kenya's Kikoys Saved (Traideraft Apr 2, 2008),
online at
http://www.traidcraft.co.uk/news-and-events/news/kikoys saved.pdf (visited Mar 29, 2012);
Intellectual Property Office (UK), Case details for Trade Mark 2431257, online at
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/types/tm/t-os/t-find/t-find-number?detailsrequested=C&trademark=
2431257 (visited Mar 29, 2012).
Inter-Territorial Language Committee for the East African Dependencies, A Standard SwahiliEnglish Dictionary 194 (Oxford 1981). Women wear similar items called kanga. Id at 172.

3

See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Kenya-Economy (CIA 2012), online at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html
(visited Mar 29,
2012).

4

Joyce Mulama, EastAfricans May Be Strepped of the Kikoi (Inter Press Service News Agency Mar 30,
2007), online at http://ipsiews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=37165 (visited Mar 29, 2012).

5

Kenya's Kikoys Saved (cited in note 2).

6

The UK Trade Marks Act says that marks cannot be registered if they "consist exclusively of signs
or indications which have become customary in the current language or in the bona fide and
established practices of the trade." Trade Marks Act (1994), c 26, § 3.1(d) (UK). Since kikoi is a
customary word only in East Africa, not in the "current language" of the UK, English, it would
appear to fall outside this exception. Thus, it is possible that the company could have registered
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The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS)' provides minimum standards for all states party. Requiring much
stronger intellectual property (IP) protection than previous agreements, TRIPS
has been a source of controversy since its enactment.8 The agreement resulted
from negotiations during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement of
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), after negotiations in the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) failed.' Building on the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention)10 and Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention)," TRIPS
added provisions for service marks and geographical indications, and increased
the level of protection for other intellectual property rights (IPRs).12 Many have
argued that TRIPS unfairly disadvantages developing countries due to its high
level of IP protections because of the resources necessary for its implementation
and the fact that higher protections are given to IPRs dominated by developed
countries.13 Dubbed the North-South split, most of the producers of IP are
located in wealthy countries where robust systems of IP protection existed long

the term as a trademark. On the other hand, the UK Act excludes marks that are "of such a
nature as to deceive the public (for instance as to the nature, quality or geographical origin of the
goods or service)." Id at 5 3.3(b). The question would then turn on whether consumers of the
kikoi would be deceived into thinking the East African item was indeed produced in East Africa.
Fortunately for East African producers of the kikoi, the company withdrew its application.
However, this example demonstrates the difficulties in determining whether traditional cultural
items deserve IP protection under the current laws.

7

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C (1994), Art 3.1, 1869 UN Treaty Set 299
(1994) (hereinafter TRIPS).

8

See, for example, Xu Yi-chong, Last Chance? Multilateralism,TRIPS and Developing Countries, in Justin
Malbon and Charles Lawson, eds, Interpretingand Implementing the TRIPS Agreement: Is it Fair?46, 46,
67 (Edward Elgar 2008).

9

Rachel Brewster, The Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of Linking International Trade and
IntellectualProperty, 12 Chi J Intl L 1, 10 (2011).
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Mar 20, 1883), as amended at the
Stockholm Revision Conference, 828 UN Treaty Ser 305 (1967) (hereinafter Paris Convention).

10

11
12

13

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886), 828 UN Treaty Ser
221 (hereinafter Berne Convention).
Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History andAnaysis 142-43 (Sweet & Maxwell 3d ed
2008).
See Yi-chong, Last Chance? at 46, 67 (cited in note 8). See also Kembrew McLeod, Owning Cultu:
Authorshp, Ownership, and Intellectual Propery Law 172 (Lang 2001) (describing international IP laws
as "an unrelenting battle against developing countries to force them to adopt an intellectual
property system that is advantageous to these already wealthy countries"); Brewster, 12 Chi J Intl
L at 4 (cited in note 9) (noting that while TRIPS actually provides certain benefits to developing
countries, it may be bad overall for them).
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before TRIPS. 14 In developing countries, however, where IP is consumed more
than produced, systems of IP protection are less well-developed and TRIPS has
created a huge burden both because it requires enormous administrative costs
and because the benefits to these developing countries are relatively small
compared with those to developed countries. As a result, many developing
countries have struggled to implement TRIPS."
This Comment focuses on a different kind of North-South split, where
wealthy countries misappropriate poor countries' IP without breaking
international law because of TRIPS's focus on Western-style IPRs." As a result,
wealthy countries have been able to have their cake and eat it too-they require
stringent IPRs for the type of intellectual property common in those countries,
yet give little to no protection to traditional knowledge, which is more common
and lucrative in developing countries. This "theft" by developed countries of
traditional cultural knowledge siphons money away from these emerging
economies every year."
Section II introduces rationales for protecting traditional cultural marks
(TCMs). Using justifications for trademarks, this Section discusses economic and
humanitarian reasons for protecting marks from misappropriation. Section III
analyzes the current international and domestic laws that address marks. Section
IV presents a few of the proposed solutions to the problem of the theft of
traditional IP and introduces a novel solution. Section V concludes.
II. WHY GIVE TRADITIONAL CULTURAL MARKS IP
PROTECTION?
TCMs are often left unprotected by current IP law because they are the
product of a collective effort of people across national borders and across
generations. These marks are generally considered generic and are open to use
by anyone.1 8 In countries where they are not generic, because the language of the
14

15

16
17

18

See Brewster, 12 Chi J Intl L at 12-13 (cited in note 9) (describing how developed countries
moved negotiations from the WIPO, which had few developing country members, to the WTO,
which had many, in order to spread IPRs to those countries that had no interest in establishing
them).
Carolyn Deere, The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global Politics of Intellectual
Property Reform in Developing Countries 1-2, 10 (Oxford 2009) (citing a 2002 World Bank report that
estimated the costs for implementing TRIPS in various developing countries-$15.3 billion for
the Republic of Korea, $5.1 billion for China, $903 million for India, and $530 million for Brazil).
See Section III.
See Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of TraditionalKnowledge, 70 L & Contemp Prob 97, 112 (2007)
(citing a UN estimate of $5 billion in royalties that are lost every year from the unauthorized use
of traditional knowledge).
See Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern Intellectual Property Regmes: A Reappraisal of the
Tensions Between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the United States, 48 Am U L Rev 769,
798 (1999) (arguing that in Nigeria "local producers probably would not be concerned with
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mark is not commonly spoken, they are considered "free for the taking" as
trademarks." However, there are many reasons, both economic and
humanitarian, for giving IP protection to traditional cultural marks. This Section
will discuss why the kikoi deserves protection from international IP law.
A. The Economic Argument
The main economic reasons for granting protection to trademarks2 0 are
that trademarks reduce consumer search costs and provide an incentive for
producers to maintain consistent quality.21 In the context of traditional cultural
marks, this means kikoi gives consumers information about the product and
incentivizes East African producers to create high quality goods.
Trademark protection for TCMs benefits consumers by providing them
with reliable information about the source of the products and ensuring
authenticity. 22 "There is a growing consumer interest in environmentally sound
or socially responsible quality products-in other words, authentic products
with a solid tradition behind them." 23 By giving trademark protection to
traditional producers, it ensures that consumers are receiving an authentic
traditional cultural item. Without IPRs for these products, companies that have
no relation to the cultural origins of the products could sell them to consumers
using the same marks. This has the potential to mislead consumers into thinking
the products are authentic or, in the alternative, would require significant search
costs to discover the products' true origins. IPRs such as trademarks and
geographical indications are well suited to traditional cultural items because they
can be maintained in perpetuity and they cover only the mark used to identify

19

20

21

inserting identifying marks to distinguish their goods from those made by others; and as a result
any marks on their goods would not be sufficiently unique to qualify for protection under
Nigerian trademark law").
Boatema Boateng, Walking the Tradition-Modernity Tightrope: Gender Contradictionsin Textile Production
and Intellectual Property Law in Ghana, 15 Am U J Gender Soc Poly & L 341, 345 (2007).
This section will mainly focus on trademarks because geographical indications are relatively new
and the rationales for IP protection for the two types of IPRs are similar. Geographical
indications are essentially collective trademarks that identify a product as closely associated with a
particular geographic area. See Jayashree Watal, IntellectualProperty Rights in the IVTO and Developing
Countries244 (Kluwer 2001).
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, TrademarkLaw: An Economic Perspective, 30 J L & Econ
265, 269-70 (1987).

2

23

David R. Downes, How Intellectual Property Could Be a Tool to Protect TraditionalKnowledge, 25 Colum J
Envir L 253, 271 (2000). See also Sunder, 70 L & Contemp Prob at 116 (cited in note 17) (citing
Fair Trade coffee and dolphin-safe tuna as examples of products for which consumers are willing
to pay more in order to ensure they are "free from the worry about exploitation in the process of
production").
Felix Addor and Alexandra Grazioli, GeographicalIndicationsBeyond Wine and Spirits:A Roadmapfor a
Better Protectionfor GeographicalIndications in the WFTO/TRIPS Agreement, 5 J World Intel Prop 865,
890 (2002).
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the good rather than the underlying product itself.2 4 In fact, facsimiles of the
kikoi exist and are sold under different terms in different countries, such as
26
"sarong,",25 "sapOt,"
and "lungi." 2 7 What separates the kikoi from these items,
and what distinguishes each item from the others, is geographic origin. As stated
above, many consumers do care about the origins of the products they buy, and
so these terms can contain useful information for consumers. Plus, there should
be few concerns of access costs for producers in developed countries. In
English, for example, generic terms for kikoi exist in "wrap" 28 and "skirt."
IPRs also encourage manufacturers to maintain consistent quality.29
Trademarks reward producers for building up a positive reputation,30 but this is
dependent on the producer's ability to maintain quality consistently.3 1 If quality
in the context of traditional goods means authenticity, then allowing nontraditional producers to use the same mark as traditional producers would lead
to inconsistent quality and eventually destroy the value of the mark. Professors
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner explain:
The free-riding competitor will, at little cost, capture some of the profits
associated with a strong trademark because some consumers will assume (at
least in the short run) that the free rider's and the original trademark
holder's brands are identical. If the law does not prevent it, free riding will
eventually destroy the information capital embodied in a trademark. 32

24

Landes and Posner, 30 J L & Econ at 287-88 (cited in note 21).

25

Nicholas Awde, Swahilk-English English-SwahiliDicdonay 96 (Hippocrene 2000).

26

Atom Sunil Singh, Indigenous Games Between Cambodia and Manipur: A Borderless Connectivity (Sangai
Express June 4, 2008), online at http://www.e-pao.net/epSubPageExtractor.asp?src=
(visited
manipur.Sports andManipur.indigenous-Games-betweenCambodia andManipur
Mar 30, 2012).
Francesca Mancini, et al, Acute Pestidde PoisoningAmong Female and Male Cotton Grywers in India, 11
Int J Occup Envir Health 221, 221 (2005).

27

28

Awde, Swabili-Enghsh Englsh-Swabi Dictionag 96 (cited in note 25).

29

J.H. Reichman, Implications of the Draft TRIPS Agreementfor Developing Countries as Competitors in an
Integrated World Market 18, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD")
Discussion Papers 18, UNCTAD/OSG/DP/73 (Nov 1993).

30

David R. Downes and Sarah A. Laird, Innovative Mechanisms for Sharing Benefits of Biodiversity and
Related Knowledge: Case Studies on GeographicalIndications and Trademarks *6, prepared for UNCTAD
Biotrade Initiative (Center for International Environmental Law 1999), online at
www.ciel.org/Publications/InnovativeMechanisms.pdf (visited Mar 30, 2012) (IPRs "reward
producers that invest in building the reputation of a product. They are designed to reward good
will and reputation created or built up by a producer or a group of producers over many years or
even centuries").
Landes and Posner, 30 J L & Econ at 270 (cited in note 21) (explaining that inconsistent quality
undermines the effectiveness of a trademark and discourages consumers from paying more for
the trademarked good than for an un-trademarked good).

31

32

Id.
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Non-traditional producers using traditional marks free ride off the
reputation built up over generations of traditional production. Allowing them to
use TCMs wears away at that reputation until the mark is of little value.33
Some have argued that traditional knowledge, such as the generic mark
kikoi, deserves no IP protection because it is incompatible with IP." Generic
marks are not generally given protection because they have few information
benefits to consumers and unfairly restrict competition." However, kikoi and
other TCMs are often generic only in their countries of origin, which is not
problematic because each local producer within the country of origin is
"authentic" such that the consumer information and quality control rationales
are satisfied. Therefore, there is still valuable information embedded in the mark
for consumers in other countries, as the marks indicate both the country of
origin and the good's status as a traditional cultural item. Costs imposed on
potential competitors by protecting kikoi are insignificant as those who want to
market and sell colorful skirts can still do so with the use of other marks, such as
"skirt" or "wrap." Another common argument is that, rather than being the
result of the creativity and innovation of one firm or individual, these items
belong to entire communities, an attribute inconsistent with most IPRs.
However, the introduction of collective IPRs, such as geographical indications, 3
collective marks, and certification marks, has provided a way to get around the
collectivist problem inherent in many traditional cultural marks.
B. The Humanitarian Argument
Not entirely unrelated to the economic benefits of IPRs for traditional
handicrafts are the humanitarian benefits. Millions of people around the world
33

Additionally, some have argued that inferior quality often accompanies mass production, which
may also serve to damage the reputation of the mark. See Kuruk, 48 Am U L Rev at 773 (cited in
note 18).

34

See, for example, Shubha Ghosh, Globaligaion,Patents, and TraditionalKnowledge, 17 Colum J Asian
L 73, 80 (2003) ("Public domain advocates see the creation of intellectual property rights in
traditional knowledge as leading to the path of destroying traditional structures and institutions.").

3s

Landes and Posner, 30 J L & Econ at 291-93 (cited in note 21) (noting that "any legal protection
for generic names will create socially wasteful opportunities to earn rents").

36

See Section II.B.2.

37

Collective and certification marks grant protection to IP collectively owned by multiple people or
enterprises. Collective marks distinguish some characteristic, such as geographical origin or
material, of goods or services of enterprises that are members of an association. The association
owns the mark and is responsible for setting standards and ensuring that those using the mark are
complying with its standards. Certification marks differ in that they may be used by anyone who
complies with the standards, not just members of the associations that own them. See WIPO,
at http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/collectivemarks/
Collective Marks, online
collectivemarks.htm (visited Mar 30, 2012); WIPO, Cerification Marks, online at
(visited
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ipbusiness/collectivemarks/certificationmarks.htm
Mar 30, 2012).
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are employed as producers of handicrafts.38 For many of those people, there
exist few employment alternatives. In India, for example, around nine million
people are employed in the field of handicrafts creating over $3 billion in
income.39 Allowing companies in developed countries to appropriate developing
countries' IP creates a powerful competitor that will likely put many traditional
laborers out of work. Though introducing competition may help to bring costs
down for consumers, it could also be devastating for those people whose
livelihoods depend on selling traditional cultural items. In addition, handicrafts
have been seen as a way to help traditionally oppressed people, such as women,
achieve economic independence.'
The economic and humanitarian arguments for the protection of TCMs are
closely linked. Consumers are often willing to pay more for a socially beneficial
product. As Landes and Posner put it, "The fact that two goods have the same
chemical formula does not make them of equal quality to even the most coolly
rational consumer." 41 Though they may be produced using the same materials,
consumers may not consider a kikoi made in the UK and Kenya to be the same
product. Therefore, giving a UK company a monopoly on the term would be
detrimental not only to traditional foreign producers in Kenya, but also to
domestic consumers in the UK.
III. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT LAW
A. History of International IP Law
The Paris Convention first established requirements for industrial property
rights, such as inventions, trademarks, and industrial designs in the nineteenth
century.42 A few years later, the Berne Convention introduced the concept of
copyright.4 3 It was not until nearly a century later that WIPO was established.
Before long, however, a schism emerged in WIPO between developed countries,
38

39

Several countries have as much as one-fifth of their labor force working in crafts and as many as
90 percent of women in developing countries are involved in crafts. Caroline Ramsay Merriam,
at
online
International),
(CHR
Trade in Crafts *3
Charactensics of World
2OCrafts.pdf
http://www.chfhq.org/files/Characteristcs%20of%/20World%/20Trade%20in/
(visited Feb 27, 2012).
Maureen Liebl and Tirthankar Roy, Handmade in India: TraditionalCraft Skills in a Changing World, in
Michael Finger and Philip Schuler, eds, Poor People's Knowledge: Promoting Intellectual Property in
Developing Countries 53, 54 (World Bank and Oxford 2004) (citing reports from 2000-01).

J.
4

See B.C. Mitchell, Motives ofEntrepreneurs:A Case Study of South Africa, 13:2 J Entrepreneurship 167,
170 (2004); World Women Work, online at http://www.worldwomenwork.org/products.html
(visited Mar 30, 2012) (describing an organization dedicated to helping women in Africa and Asia
achieve economic independence through the sales of their crafts).

41
42

Landes and Posner, 30J L & Econ at 275 (cited in note 21).
Paris Convention (cited in note 10).

43

Berne Convention (cited in note 11).
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which advocated for stronger IPRs, and developing countries, which wanted
weaker ones." When the seventh revision of the Paris Convention, which fell
under the auspices of WIPO, failed to achieve any results in 1980, developed
countries then moved the negotiations to GATT.4 5 Unlike WIPO negotiations,
GATT negotiations allowed developed countries to exchange stronger IPRs for
benefits for developing countries in other fields. The negotiations also led to the
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which offered effective
enforcement of agreements and a dispute resolution mechanism, something
WIPO had lacked.4 6
Members of GATT negotiated for a more comprehensive IP agreement
during the Uruguay Round and adopted TRIPS on April 15, 1994, in
Marrakesh.4 7 While developing countries lost the fight against stronger IPRs as
the norm in international law," they insisted on highlighting the importance of
policy objectives in TRIPS. Article 7 states that IPRs should be used to further
social and economic development:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 49
Two other important principles were also included in TRIPS: national treatment
and most favored nation (MFN) treatment. The national treatment provisiono
requires the application of equal treatment under domestic laws to foreign and
domestic rights holders. It also works to harmonize national laws related to IP.
The MFN provision establishes equal treatment between states party.52

44

Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPS: Background, Pindples and GeneralProdisions, in Carlos M. Correa and
Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, eds, Intellectual Prperty and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement 3, 5
(Kluwer 2d ed 2008).

45

Id at 5-6.

46

Id at 9.

47

Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement at 11, 28 (cited in note 12). The agreement allowed for separate
compliance dates for developed and developing countries. Id.
James Boyle argues that the timing of TRIPS and its sudden shift to strong IPRs can be explained
by developed countries' fears over piracy and their concern for adequate incentives and
underproduction. James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the
Information Soiety 123 (Harvard 1996).

48

49
50

s1
52

TRIPS, Art 7 (cited in note 7).
Id at Art 3.1 (stating that each member must afford nationals of other member countries the same
treatment as its own nationals subject to exceptions provided in previous agreements).
Yusuf, TRIPS at 16-17 (cited in note 44).
TRIPS, Art 4 (cited in note 7) ("With regard to the protection of intellectual property, any
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other
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While individual countries' IP frameworks may differ under TRIPS, the
agreement sets a minimum standard for intellectual property rights among
member countries. Due to the MFN provision, any agreement between TRIPS
member countries that affords higher protection of IPRs to one country must be
extended to all other member countries." This Comment focuses on the two
sections of TRIPS applicable to kikol, "Trademarks" 5 4 and "Geographical
Indications." 5
B. TRIPS
1. Article 15: Trademarks.
TRIPS Article 15 provided the first multilateral definition of a trademark:56
"[a]ny sign ... capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one
undertaking from those of other undertakings."" A definition of "undertaking"
is not provided but appears to mean the mark of a commercial enterprise.
Article 15 therefore gives IPRs to marks that distinguish one producer from
other producers. Because kikoi is a mark used by numerous individuals and
companies in East Africa, it does not fulfill the requirement. This highlights one
of the main problems with TRIPS regarding the IP protection of traditional
cultural items-the concept of individual intellectual property rights is primarily
a Western notion. IP in developing countries is often a collective effort of
numerous individuals or even entire communities.'o Since the collective nature
of traditional knowledge bars the protection of most IP laws, traditional artists
are left vulnerable to IP theft."
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other
Members.'.
53

Yusuf, TRIPS at 18 (cited in note 44).

54

Id at Arts 15-21.

ss

Id at Arts 22-24.
Watal, IntellectualProperyj Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries at 248 (cited in note 20).

56

57
58

TRIPS, Art 15 (cited in note 7).
See Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement at 266 (cited in note 12). See also Reichman, Implcations at 18
(cited in note 29) ("Trademarks serve primarily to distinguish goods or services of single firms
from those of other firms.").

s9

Jimmy Pak, Comment, Re-imagining the Wheel: Seeking a Feasible InternationalRegime to Protect Indigenous
Expressions Through Trademark Law, 24 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev L J 381, 384 (2011). See
also Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement at 135 (cited in note 12).

60

In India, for example, traditional artists "do not hold sacrosanct the notion of individual
creativity." Liebl and Roy, Handmade in India at 61 (cited in note 39).
For example, a Ghanaian artist who refused to obtain IP protection for his designs because they
were based on indigenous art had no legal recourse against American retailer JC Penney when it
later reproduced his designs on bedding. Betsy J. Fowler, Preventing Counte'eit Craft Designs, in
Finger and Schuler, eds, Poor People's Knowledge 113, 126-27 (cited in note 39) (discussing Gilbert
Ahiagble, a renowned kente cloth weaver).

61
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Consequently, by failing to extend trademark protection to traditional
cultural items like the kikoi, Article 15 may prevent trademarks from doing what
they are purported to-reduce consumers' search costs. 62 Consumers often seek
cultural products that are authentic and created in the nation whose culture they
represent. 63 Therefore, allowing a UK company to trademark and sell products
under an East African name while preventing East Africans from doing the
same in the UK would only serve to increase consumers' search costs and
mislead them into thinking they were buying an authentic product. Domestic
laws have begun to limit companies' abilities to exploit traditional cultural items
in this way-laws in New Zealand and the US empower their trademark offices
to refuse registration to marks that might offend indigenous communities.64
2. Article 22: Geographical Indications.
TRIPS was also the first international agreement to establish an IPR for
geographical indications. Geographical indications are a relatively modern type
of right that protects marks indicating a particular geographic origin. Famous
geographical indications include "Bordeaux" and "Burgundy," which indicate
the origins of the wines to which they refer.
The EU was the first to establish geographical indications rights, citing as
reasons for establishing them the protection of cultural goods from dilution, the
reduction of confusion for consumers, and the potential income for people in
developing countries. In the WTO, there were disagreements over the right
level of protection for geographical indications. However, unlike with IPRs
generally, these disagreements existed not between developed and developing
countries, but rather between the new world and the old world. 6 The US and
many new world countries sought to incorporate geographical indications into
trademarks or eliminate them altogether while the European Communities
62

63
64

65

66

Reichman, Implications at 18 (cited in note 29) (citing the reduction of search costs, the
encouragement of consistent quality over time, and the discouragement of conduct that distorts
consumer preferences as roles of trademark law). See also Section I.
See Section II.
Trade Marks Act 2002, Pub Act 2002 No 49, 17(1)(c) (NZ) (stating that grounds for refusing a
trademark include offending "a significant section of the community, including Maori"); 15 USC
§1052(a) (allowing for the refusal of a trademark that falsely suggests a connection with particular
institutions). See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Native American Tribal Insignia
Database,online at http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/law/tribal/index.jsp (visited Apr 18, 2012)
(stating that the establishment of a database of Native American insignias was created "as an aid
in the examination of applications for trademark registration" under 15 USC 51052(a)).
Coenraad J. Visser, Making Intellectual Property Laws Work for TraditionalKnowledge, in Finger and
Schuler, eds, PoorPeople's Knowledge 207, 216-17 (cited in note 39). See also Section II.2.E.
European Commission, Geographical Indications, online at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creatingopportunities/trade-topics/intellectual-property/geographical-indications/ (visited Mar 31, 2012).
Addor and Grazioli, 5 J World Intel Prop at 883 (cited in note 23); Watal, Intellectual Property Rigbts
in the WTO and Developing Countriesat 263 (cited in note 20).
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(EC)" insisted on not only a separate IPR for geographical indications but also
higher protections for wine and spirits.'" The EC successfully negotiated for
strong geographical indications protections and these IPRs have continued to
be a cause of disagreement and the subject of continued negotiations.7 0
Geographical indications, unlike trademarks, are a collective right, and are
therefore better suited to traditional cultural items than trademarks. All
producers of a good located in the place indicated by the geographical indication
are free to use it. There are three parts to the definition of a geographical
indication under TRIPS: (1) the mark must indicate a geographic location, (2)
that geographic location must be contained in one member country, and (3) a
quality, reputation, or other characteristic of the good must be attributable to
that location."
Geographical indications generally identify a geographic location through
an appellation of origin, or the name of a geographic place (for example,
Bordeaux wine or Roquefort cheese), but they may be any sign or mark that
helps the consumer identify the good as originating in a certain place. Symbols,
such as the Eiffel Tower's indication that a good originates in Francen or terms
that have come to be associated with certain countries, such as feta,n are
examples of geographical indications that do not refer directly to a geographic
location. Since kikol does not explicitly refer to a particular geographic location,
67

68

69

70

7'

The EC, now known as the EU, comprises all of the EU countries. In the WTO, the EU is a
member in its own right. WTO, Member Information: The European Union and the WITO, online at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/countriese/european communitiese.htm (visited Mar
31, 2012).
A few new world wine-producing nations joined the EC in its goal to protect geographical
indications related to wine and spirits. Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing
Countries at 265 (cited in note 20) (noting that Australia, Canada, Chile, and Argentina were also
interested in strong protection for wine geographical indications).
Concessions were made to the US in the form of Article 24.4, which made an exclusion for goodfaith uses of geographical indications and those that had been used continuously for at least 10
years. TRIPS, Art 24.4 (cited in note 7).
See WTO, Council for TRIPS, Proposalfrom Bulgaria, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Iceland, India,
Jamaica, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Suitzerland, Turkey and
Venequela, IP/C/W/247/Revl (May 17, 2001) (proposing to extend geographical indications
rights beyond wine and spirits).
TRIPS, Art 22.1 (cited in note 7).

72

David Vivas-Eugui and Christoph Spennemann, The Evoling Regime for GeographicalIndications in
WTO and in Free Trade Agreements, in Correa and Yusuf, eds, Intellectual Property and International
Trade 163, 170 (cited in note 44), citing examples from Sergio Escudero, InternationalProtection of
Geographical Indications and Developing Countries *5 (South Centre Trade-Related Agenda
Development and Equity Working Paper No 10, July 2001).

73

See FederalRepublic of Germany and Kingdom of Denmark v Commission, Cases C-465/02 and C-466/02,
2005 ECR 1-09115, 9190 (Oct 25, 2005) (declaring "feta" eligible for registration as a "protected
designation of origin," an EC equivalent of a geographical indication).
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the next question is whether it indicates an East African origin. Kikoi is a Swahili
word that refers to a skirt traditionally worn by men. While it may indeed help
consumers identify the origin of the good as African, it may not indicate East
Africa or any particular East African country to most consumers. Thus it is not
clear kikoi even satisfies the first element of a geographical indication.
Second, Article 22 only protects geographical indications originating in one
member country or a region or territory within that country.74 The term kikoi,
however, has its origins in East Africa generally, not any one particular East
African member country. Since the term has its origins in the Swahili culture
rather than in any particular country, giving geographical indication protection to
Kenya would deny rights to countries such as Tanzania and Uganda.7 ' Two
possible solutions exist to this problem. First, each member country could file
for a separate geographical indication, so that there would be a Kenyan kikoi, a
Tanzanian kikoi, etc. 76 Another, albeit more complicated, solution would be for
East African member countries to form a single WTO bloc akin to the EU. The
EU acts as a member of the WTO, but each EU member is also a member in its
own right. If East African countries were to follow suit, it would allow East
Africa to file for geographical indication protection for cultural items originating
in various member countries, but would still allow each individual East African
country to file for IPRs independently.
Another issue with kikoi, which may be either a bane or a boon for the
protection of TCMs generally, is the exclusion of generic terms. Article 24.6
states that TRIPS does not require any member to give protection to another
member's geographical indication if the indication is "identical with the term
customary in common language as the common name for such goods or services
in the territory of that Member." That is, what may be protected as a
geographical indication in one country might lose protection in another if it is
customary or common for the good in that country. Examples include Cheddar
7
cheese, Arabica coffee, and kiwifruit.n
One reason for refusing protection to
generic terms is to prevent a linguistic monopoly.78 However, granting
protection for kikoi does not create an unreasonable linguistic barrier to

74

TRIPS, Art 22.1 (cited in note 7).

7s

Given that political borders in many regions of Africa were created without regard to ethnic
divisions, this may be a problem pandemic to the continent. See Robert Blanton, T. David
Mason, and Brian Athow, Colonial Style and Post-ColonialEthnic Conflict in Africa, 38 J Peace Rsrch
473, 473 (2001). See also Jeffrey Herbst, The Creation and Maintenance of NationalBoundaries in Africa,
43 Intl Org 673, 674--75 (1989).
There appears to be no precedent for this in the WTO. However, this is allowed in the EC, where
ouzo from Greece and Cyprus is a protected geographical indication. Council Regulation
110/2008, OJ (L39) 16, 52.

76

77
78

Vivas-Eugui and Spennemann, The Evolving Regime at 173 (cited in note 72).
See Landes and Posner, 30 J L & Econ at 292 (cited in note 21).
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competitors. This is illustrated by the number of other terms available to
producers to describe the same product: skirt, sarong, or wrap. Since the term
kikoirefers only to the skirt itself and not to a type of skirt or the region where it
originated, however, it could still be considered generic. The European Court of
Justice provides the following definition of a generic geographical indication:
Therefore, as regards a [protected geographical indication], a name becomes
generic only if the direct link between, on the one hand, the geographical
origin of the product and, on the other hand, a specific quality of that
product, its reputation or another characteristic of the product, attributable
to that origin, has disappeared, and that the name does no more than
describe a style or type of product.79
The question of genericness therefore turns on the third element required
by Article 22, that is, whether there is a link between the geographical origin and
some attribute, either a quality or characteristic, or the reputation of the good.
Most products that are geographical indications are agricultural in nature
and so the relationship between the quality or characteristic of the good and the
geographical origin is obvious. This is most evident in the context of wine,
where the terroir,or geography and climate, is thought to produce the flavors of
the particular wine."0 With the case of the kikoi, this does not appear to be quite
so obvious. The kikoi is made of cotton and is known for its bright colors,
characteristics that are not obviously linked to East Africa. However, Article 22
also says that the reputation of the good may be attributable to its geographical
origin:"' "Reputation is the result of years of work in association with a product
that has created a mental link between that product and its geographical
origin." 82 Is kikoi's reputation linked to its geographical origin? A Google search
of "kikoy" turned up websites selling the product in various forms. Many of the
websites gave a brief description of the item describing it as African, East
African, or Kenyan in origin." This suggests that the reputation of the product
may be linked to its geographic origin.

79

BavariaNV v Bayerischer Brauerbund eV, Case C-343/07 2009 ECR I-05491 (July 2, 2009).

80

81

Tim Josling, PresidentialAddress: The War on Terroir: GeographicalIndications as a Transatlantic Trade
Conflict, 57 J Ag Econ 337, 338 (2006) (describing disputes over geographical indications between
states party of TRIPS).
This differs from the Brussels Draft, in which reputation itself was not a characteristic of the
good, but an effect of the good's quality or characteristics. UNCTAD-International Centre for
Trade and Sustainable Development ("ICTSD") Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development,
Resource Book on TRIPS and Development 287-88 (Cambridge 2005).

82

Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement at 298 (cited in note 12).

83

See, for example, The Kikoy Co., online at www.kikoy.com (visited Mar 31, 2012) ("Kikoys are
exclusive to the East African coast, in particular Kenya, where we weave them with the finest
cotton grown in the region."); Kikoy Kiosk, online at www.kikoykiosk.com (visited Mar 31, 2012)
("Our kikoys come directly from Kenya.... Each Kikoy is made from cotton grown in Kenya.");
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However, the exclusion of generic terms could actually help kikoi. Article
24.6 states that no protection is required in countries where the term is generic.
This means that while kikoi may remain unprotected in countries such as Kenya,
where it has become generic, it would likely stay protected in most developed
countries, where the Swahili word is uncommon. In East Africa, therefore, it
would receive no protection and remain in the public domain where anyone
could produce the items under the mark kikoi. Thus this generic exclusion could
potentially help the GI protection of certain traditional cultural items by
simultaneously keeping the term in the public domain in its countries of origin,
while also protecting it in the developed countries where it remains most
vulnerable to theft.
Even with geographical indications protection, however, TCMs might be
under-protected. Article 22.2 states that member countries must provide legal
means to prevent the use of a geographical indication that "misleads the public
as to the geographical origin" or "constitutes an act of unfair competition"
under the Paris Convention. Article 10bis of the Paris Convention precludes
indications that are "liable to mislead the public" with respect to the nature,
manufacture, characteristics, suitability, or quantity of the goods. These two
provisions together appear to prohibit the use of a geographical indication when
either the public is misled or when the public is likely to be misled. Therefore, it
is possible that even with geographical indications protection, a UK company
could sell a product called kikoi as long as the true geographic origin was also
named (perhaps "kikqy-style skirts from Kent"). However, this would still likely
dilute the reputation of the kikoi by severing the link between the kikoi and East
Africa or offering a potentially inferior-quality product. As a result, many
developing countries have criticized TRIPS for providing weaker protection in
Article 22 than in Article 23, which establishes geographical indications for wine
and spirits and specifically prohibits the use of accompanied expressions such as
"kind," "type," or "style." 8 4 Because geographical indications for wine and spirits
tend to come from developed countries, and Europe in particular, much of the
criticism of this two-tiered protection has come from developing countries."
These countries argue that "Article 22 allows producers from other regions to
easily usurp a [geographical indication] and free-ride on its reputation without
rendering any possibility to the legitimate producers to stop such actions as long

84
85

Kikoy Shop, online at www.kikoyshop.com (visited Mar 31, 2012) (referring to their products as
"Original Kikoys from Kenya").
Council for TRIPS, ProposalfromBugaria (cited in note 70).
See id. The US and Canada have also been opponents of higher protection for wine and spirits.
They have apparently been able to evade implementing this higher protection by declaring some
of the geographical indications generic or sen-igeneric. Watal, IntellectualPropeny Rightr in the WTO
and Developing Countriesat 268 (cited in note 20).
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as the true origin of the product is stated."86 Felix Addor and Alexandra Grazioli
have argued that the Article 22 protection is inadequate because it allows
producers to misappropriate a geographical indication, thus undermining the
economic benefits to legitimate producers and misleading consumers as to the
authenticity of the product. "
Finally, there appears to be no rational economic reason for having higher
protections for wine and spirits than for other goods. Article 23 was a trade
concession made during negotiations." Indeed, there exist similar items, such as
coffee and beer, which receive no greater protection despite having the same
qualities as wine and spirits." The higher protection for wine and spirits could
easily be extended to cover all goods, which would help stop the dilution of
TCMs like kikoi. Since TRIPS, efforts to extend the Article 22 protections to
match those in Article 23 have begun and may help efforts to protect TCMs.90

86

Addor and Grazioli, 5 J World Intel Prop at 884 (cited in note 23).

87

Id at 880-81.

88

This is not a point of contention between proponents and opponents of extension:
This differential treatment of geographical indications can only be explained in
the light of the negotiations of the Uruguay Round. The relevant TRIPS
provisions are the result of trade-offs which were specific to the circumstances
prevailing at the time of the Uruguay Round negotiations, in particular during
the Brussels Ministerial Conference (1990). This was, to some extent, due to
the link at that time between the negotiations on geographical indications and
the negotiations on agriculture.
WTO, Council for TRIPS, Communicationfrom Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Iceland, India, Kenya,
Liechtenstein, Pakistan,Slovenia, Sri Lanka, SwitZerland and Turkey, IP/C/W/204/Revl (Oct 2, 2000)
(arguing that Article 23 should be extended).
The additional level of protection provided under Article 23 is the result of a
negotiating compromise reached in the broader context of the Uruguay Round
negotiations. This compromise, sought by several wine-producing countries,
particularly the EC, represented a significant concession by a number of
Members, among them other wine-producing Members, that did not see the
need to create an imbalance in [geographical indication] protection by
conferring increased protection on wine and spirit [geographical indications].
WTO, Council for TRIPS, Communication from Agentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Guatemala, New
Zealand, Paraguayand the United States, IP/C/W/289 (June 29, 2001) (arguing against extension).

89

See Bryan Lewin, Daniele Giovannucci, and Panos Varangis, Coffee Markets: New Paradigms in
Global Supply and Demand *109 (Agriculture and Rural Development Discussion Paper 3, World
Bank 2004), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=996111 (visited Mar
31, 2012) (citing Jamaican Blue Mountain and Hawaiian Kona as examples of coffee that should
be given IP protection). This may be another sore point for Kenya, which is a large exporter of
coffee. International Coffee Organization, Exports by Exporting Countries to All Destinations, online
at http://www.ico.org/prices/m1.htm (visited Mar 31, 2012). India argued for additional
protection for tea, Mexico for tequila, and other countries for cheese, chocolate, and beer. Watal,
IntellectualProperty Rights in the IVTO and Developing Countriesat 266-67 (cited in note 20).

90

See, for example, WTO, General Council, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference:
Communicationfrom Cuba, Dominican Republic, Eppt, Honduras,India, Indonesia, Nicaraguaand Pakistan,

254

Vol. 13 No. 1

Maulik

Skirting the Issue

C. Related International IP Laws
The Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive
Indications of Source on Goods (Madrid Agreement)," first enacted in 1891,
provided a limited extension to the Paris Convention. Article 1.1 prohibited
goods bearing "false or deceptive indication[s]." Apparently, the reference to
deceptive indications as separate from false indications was a way to prohibit
marks that used a qualifier, such as "California Burgundy," when the mark might
nonetheless mislead consumers." This reflects the protections afforded to wine
and spirits in TRIPS, but the Madrid Agreement establishes them for all goods.
There are only thirty-five contracting members, with the US and a number of
European countries not parties to the agreement.9 4
The Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and
their International Registration (Lisbon Agreement),95 drafted in 1958,
established protection for appellations of origin. These included actual
geographical names of countries, regions, or localities and protection included
the prohibition of imitation even if the true origin of the product was indicated
("kind," "type," etc.), like the Madrid Agreement." There are only twenty-seven

member parties to the Lisbon Agreement.97 TRIPS was negotiated in part
because of the limited acceptance of the Madrid and Lisbon Agreements.
In addition, a number of agreements to centralize registration systems have
been created to make it easier to file for IPRs in foreign countries. For example,
the Madrid Protocol" created a centralized system where a trademark owner can
file one application with his own national or regional trademark office and have
it sent to an international registration system. However, it is merely a filing

91

WT/GC/W/208 (une 17, 1999) (requesting that the protection of Article 23 be extended to
other products).
Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source on Goods, 828
UN Treaty Ser 165 (1958) (hereinafter Madrid Agreement).

92

Id at Art 1.1.

93

Resource Book at 271-72 (cited in note 81).

94

WVIPO, Contracing Parties: Madrid Agreement, online at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/
ShowResults.sp?lang=en&treaty jd=3 (visited Mar 31, 2012).
Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their International
Registration, 923 UN Treaty Ser 197 (1958) (hereinafter Lisbon Agreement).
Id at Art 3.

9s

96

97

WIPO, Contracting Parties: Lisbon Agreement, online at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/
ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treary_id=10 (visited Mar 31, 2012).

98

See Resource Book at 321 (cited in note 81).

99

Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, S
Treaty Doc 106-41 (1989) (hereinafter Madrid Protocol).
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treaty, which means that each country still has the right to determine whether or
not to issue protection for a mark.o
D. Other Multilateral and Bilateral IP Agreements
While TRIPS appears to protect TCMs like kikoi inadequately, a growing
number of other multinational treaties, particularly among developing countries,
have emerged to fill the gap.' The Andean Community, consisting of Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, has an IP treaty with provisions recognizing both
individual trademarks10 2 and collective trademarks.103 In order to qualify for a
collective trademark, there needs to be "legally established associations" of
producers who can distinguish the goods of their members from others.1 0 4 This
is one way in which TCMs can receive trademark protection while including not
only multiple producers of the goods, but also producers across national
boundaries. While establishing legally recognized associations may be a difficult
task in poor countries, especially in rural areas, an IP regime that recognizes
collective trademarks would help assure consumers of the authenticity of the
products.
In addition, multinational blocs in Africa have set up IP systems that may

help protect cultural items from misappropriation. There are two main IP
groups on the continent: the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization
(ARIPO), which consists of English-speaking African nations, and the
Organisation Africaine de la Propriete Intellectuelle (OAPI), consisting of many
of the French-speaking nations. ARIPO has a centralized registration system for
trademarks where each application is sent to every member nation for
substantive review.'01 Under the Banjul Protocol, each member country has one
year to determine whether the application complies with the country's domestic
laws.' 6 This system protects cultural items by essentially providing a monitoring
system for the trademark applications in other African countries. OAPI also

100

Id at Art 3.1.

101 See Pak, Comment, 24 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev LJ at 394-95 (cited in note 59).
102
Cartagena Agreement, Arts 161-64 (Sept 14, 2000), online at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/
text.jsp?fileid=223717 (visited Mar 31, 2011).
103

Id at Arts 180-81.

104

Id at Art 181.

105 Banjul Protocol on Marks (Nov 19,

1993), online at www.wipo.int/clea/docs-new/pdf/en/
ap/ap004en.pdf (visited Mar 31, 2012) (hereinafter Banjul Protocol); Pak, 24 Pac McGeorge
Global Bus & Dev L J at 395-96 (cited in note 59); Ladas & Parry LLP, ARIPO: BanjulProtocol on
Trade Alarks (July 2006) online at http://wwv.ladas.com/BULLETINS/2006/ARIPOTM.shtml
(visited Mar 31, 2012).

1o6 Banjul Protocol § 6.
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oversees a central register, and its Bangui Agreement has a provision for
collective marks. 07
Of course, only developing countries are states party to these agreements.
Wealthy countries prefer bilateral negotiations because it allows them to
exchange trade concessions for stronger IPRs in other countries. Thus, there has
been a shift from multilateral to bilateral negotiations regarding IPRs.'" In fact, a
surprising proponent of added protection for TCMs comes from bilateral
agreements negotiated by the EU. Not surprisingly, perhaps, these agreements
all have to do with wine and spirits. For example, the EU-Chile Agreement on
Trade in Wines'09 protects traditional expressions related to wine geographical
indications. This includes terms such as "Vino dulce natural," "Eiswein," and
"Tawny" on the EU side and "Reserva o Reservas" and "Noble" on the Chilean
side."10 These expressions do not indicate a particular geographic area and thus
are not likely covered by TRIPS. Indeed the words "Eiswein" and "Tawny" are
likely to fall under the TRIPS generic exclusion as they mean "ice wine" and
"yellow-brown," respectively.
A similar agreement between the EU and South Africa gives protection to
certain terms for wine and spirits, including "port" and "sherry," which the EU
claims indicate geographic origins."' Under the agreement, South Africa has
twelve years to phase out the use of the terms in its domestic market. The EU's
motivation for this treaty was likely the fact that the terms, along with "grappa"
and "ouzo," would have been deemed generic by the WTO and would thus have
remained unprotected by TRIPS.' 12
E. Domestic Laws Protecting Indigenous Traditional
Knowledge
The growing clout of indigenous groups means an increasing number of
domestic laws that protect indigenous traditional knowledge. For example, the

107

Bangui Agreement Relating to the Creation of an African Intellectual Property Organization,
Constituting a Revision of the Agreement Relating to the Creation of an African and Malagasy
Office of Industrial Property, Ann III, Art 2(2), (March 2, 1977), online at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other-treaties/details.jsp?treaty-id=227 (visited Mar 31, 2012).

108

Vivas-Eugui and Spennemann, The Evoking Regime at 213 (cited in note 72).

109

See Agreement Establishingan Association Between the European Community and its Members States, of the
one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the otherpart,2002 OJ (L 352) 3 (Nov 18, 2002) (hereinafter EUChile Agreement).

110

Vivas-Eugui and Spennemann, The Evolving Regime at 190-91 (cited in note 72); EU-Chile
Agreement, Append III-IV, 1175, 1174, 1176, 1188, 1189 (cited in note 109).

1It

Specifically, Duoro, Portugal for "port" and Jerez, Spain for "sherry." Emily Craven and Charles
Mather, GeographicalIndications and the South Aflica-European Union Free Trade Agreement, 33.3 Area
312, 314 (2001).

112

Id.
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the US Indian Arts and Crafts Act1 3 makes it illegal to sell any art or craft "in a
manner that falsely suggests it is [American] Indian produced, [or] an Indian
product."" 4 Penalties include up to $250,000 in fines and up to five years in
prison for fraud."' Similarly, states in the southwestern US have enacted laws
that require sellers of these goods to ensure that they are in fact being produced
by indigenous people in the traditional way."' Native American arts and crafts
garner as much as $800 million in the southwestern US alone."'
In New Zealand, the trademark office must refuse to register trademarks
that offend indigenous cultures. Section 17.1(c) of the Trade Marks Act states
that no trademark may be registered that would "be likely to offend a significant
section of the community, including Maori.""' In the US, the Lanham Act also
prohibits disparaging marks, though without a focus on indigenous people." 9
Panama has a suigeneris system of IPRs.120 The National Crafts Department
of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry distributes certification stamps to
ensure authenticity of products' 2 ' and the state bans any imports resembling
indigenous crafts unless the associated indigenous community gives
permission.122 The Department of Collective Rights and Forms of Folkloric
Expression grants collective copyrights to indigenous people and traditional
culture cannot be registered for IP protection by any third party in any form.123
Unlike the approaches taken in the US and New Zealand, this system gives the
indigenous people themselves, rather than a judiciary, the power to determine
whether a good is permissible. Panama's approach has been dubbed an
unnecessarily commercial approach to the protection of indigenous
knowledge,12 4 but nonetheless serves to protect indigenous knowledge from
being misappropriated.

113

Pub L No. 101-644, 104 Stat 4662 (1990), codified in various sections of Titles 18 and 25.

114 18 USC § 1159.

115

Id.

116

See Downes, 25 Colum J Envir L at 270 (cited in note 22).

117

Id.

118

Trade Marks Act 2002, Pub Act 2002 No 49 (NZ).

19

15 USC

120

Pak, 24 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev L J at 389 (cited in note 59).

121

Fowler, Preventing Countefeit Craft Designs at 123-24 (cited in note 61).

122

Id.

123

Id.

§ 1052(a).

124 Pak, 24 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev L J at 390 (cited in note 59).
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IV. SOLUTIONS
A number of solutions have been offered to the problem of protecting
traditional knowledge. From the expansion of IPRs to eliminating them
altogether, scholars differ widely. This Section discusses solutions that have been
proposed and introduces a relatively simple solution that may nonetheless have
the desired effect of providing protection for TCMs.
A. Extension of Geographical Indications Protection in

TRIPS
Some have called the idea of expanding TRIPS Article 23 beyond wine and
spirits bad for developing countries, arguing that it would simply further the
administrative burden of enforcing IPRs without necessarily bringing any
benefits. 125 Others have argued that the costs associated with extending
geographical indications protection are marginal in comparison to the total cost
of implementing TRIPS. 126 Those who argue for extension say Article 22
provides insufficient protection to goods that are not wine and spirits. 127 In
terms of benefits to consumers, Addor and Grazioli note:
The actual level of protection attributed to GIs for wines and spirits gives
consumers confidence in the true origin of a product, which has addedvalue and specific qualities due to its geographical origin. There is no doubt
that consumers would also benefit if the scope of Article 23 is extended to
products beyond wine and spirits.128
In addition, geographical indications are not so different from other IPRs, such
as trademarks and patents, which do not have different levels of protection for
different types of products.
The costs of expanding Article 22 to include the rights in Article 23 might
actually have an effect of reducing costs. Whereas Article 22 requires proof that
a mark is misleading or likely to be misleading as to the geographic origin of the
product, Article 23 does not require any showing of confusion.' If extended to
cover all goods, Article 23 protection would reduce the administrative efforts
necessary to determine whether there is any confusion; it would be enough
simply to show that a producer outside the geographic location was using the
125

126
127
128
129

Data Williams, Extension of Stronger Geographical Indications Ptotection [sic]: Against the Interests of
Developing Countries?, 6(4) Bridges Monthly, 17-18 (JCTSC May 2002), online at
http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridges/bridges6-4.pdf (visited Apr 1, 2012).
Addor and Grazioli, 5 J World Intel Prop at 887 (cited in note 23).
Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement at 103 (cited in note 12).
Addor and Grazioli, 5 J World Intel Prop at 890 (cited in note 23).
TRIPS, Art 23.1 (cited in note 7) (stating that members shall provide means for interested parties
to "prevent use of a geographical indication identifying wines for wines not originating in the
place indicated by the geographical indication ... even when the true origin of the goods is
indicated").
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geographical indication. Therefore, the costs associated with determining a
violation might actually be reduced.'3 0
B. Public Domain
Others have argued that TCMs like kikoi belong in the public domain.
Indeed, there are serious disadvantages to protecting the term, as it may
unnecessarily confuse consumers into thinking the good is substantially different
from a wrap or sarong when it is essentially the same product. For those who do
not care about the origins of a good, this might misleadingly eliminate potential
substitutes.' 1 The monopoly power of trademarks and geographical indications
could in fact increase search costs for consumers.
In addition, the incentive benefits conferred by trademark protection, for
example to develop a valuable trademark through consistent quality,13 may not
apply to traditional items. Traditional people often create handicrafts as a way of
expressing their culture or as one of very few options to make a livelihood, not
to access a large global market.'33 Free riding on their reputation may not have
the same effect as free riding on the reputation of a for-profit enterprise.
However, as the public domain enthusiast, James Boyle, points out, economic
benefits provide incentives even to the least capitalist people. The rosy
periwinkle, a plant that contains properties thought to treat diabetes and other
chronic diseases, was eradicated by traditional people in Madagascar to make
way for food crops. 134 This example has been highlighted as one justification for
providing traditional people with the economic benefits of IPRs." As East
Africa becomes more industrialized, people might be less likely to produce
traditional items, a problem that could be exacerbated by the existence of large
companies in rich countries who can out-produce and out-sell traditional people.
Another problem of granting IPRs for kikoi relates to the lack of "acquired
rights." If kikoi were granted geographical indications protection, emigrants
from East Africa could not continue to produce the good using that term in
their new countries. Since handicrafts are tied more to the traditions of the
people than to the land itself, this would be an unnecessary loss. Those who
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leave their home countries may find themselves leaving some of their culture
behind. 36
Keeping kikoi in the public domain at least has the advantage of allowing
anyone, that is, any East African producer and any company in other countries,
to produce the item under the mark. A UK company could not attempt to
prevent East Africans from marketing their traditional item in the UK. The
public domain, along with certification or collective marks, could actually
accomplish for TCMs much of what trademarks and geographical indications
attempt to do. It would provide consumers with accurate information, reduce
their search costs, and still allow competitors to access the market.
C. Paying Public Domain
A domaine public payant, or paying public domain, is a system that allows
people to use traditional knowledge without first gaining permission but requires
them to provide remuneration to traditional people.13 7 The payment goes to a
fund that is entrusted to an NGO or foundation.' The main problem with this
system is that the money would go to a third party and may never reach the
hands of the actual traditional producers of the kikoi,'39 thus eliminating the
potential economic benefits of the IPR.
In a similar scheme, Jerome Reichman and Tracy Lewis compare
intellectual property law with tort law and argue that using a liability rule can
help create economic incentives in developing countries without granting
traditional knowledge full IPRs.140 They describe a "take and pay" rule, which
would allow people to use traditional knowledge without receiving permission,
but would require compensation.
These schemes work like compulsory licenses and afford the benefits of
the public domain with many of the economic. benefits of a traditional IPR.
However, the actual delivery of the money to traditional people would likely
make the system costly and difficult to implement.
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D. Generic In Any Language Exception
The aforementioned solutions would involve huge and unlikely shifts from
the current framework. The public domain solution in particular seems unlikely
to occur given how important IPRs are to developed countries. However, a
simpler and more narrow solution existing within the current legal framework
may accomplish many of the same objectives: if a mark is found to be used
generically in commerce in any language spoken in any states party to the
agreement, such a finding would trigger cancellation of the mark.
The current TRIPS generic exclusion in Article 24.6 allows members to
refuse to protect geographical indications that have become common or
customary in their countries. This may help the protection of kikoi in this
instance, as it allows the term to be protected abroad where companies in
wealthy countries may not be able to use it, but allows the term to remain in the
public domain in East Africa, where traditional producers can use it. However, a
more favorable system for traditional items may actually be one with a broader
generic exclusion. It was the UK Trade Marks Act's narrow exclusion for
generic terms, where only terms that were generic in the "common language" of
the UK were excluded, that first made kikoi vulnerable to IP theft in the UK.141
Thus, a more robust international IP exclusion, where any term that was generic
in any language spoken by any people of any states party was excluded from IP
protection, may actually help traditional cultural marks. If a trademark or
geographical indication turns out to be used generically in commerce in any
language, it would be subject to cancellation. Traditional producers who want to
distinguish their goods from non-traditional producers could use appellations
such as "Made in Kenya" or certification marks to ensure the authenticity of
their products.
This is a narrower version of the public domain solution, as the burden of
showing genericness would rest with the state party who wants to cancel the
right. Since courts frequently analyze genericness of terms, it would be a
relatively easy addition to the current legal framework. In addition, it would
require no additional laws regarding TCMs or expressions and would protect
TCMs from being misappropriated by other countries simply because the term is
fanciful in those countries. An international register of generic TCMs, such as
the one proposed by Article 23 of TRIPS for wine and spirits,'42 would help
make this process easier.
A generic exclusion that takes into account all languages spoken in all states
party would be consistent with other IPRs in TRIPS. Patents are protected
"without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and

141

See Section II.

142

TRIPS, Art 23.4 (cited in note 7).

262

Vol. 13 No. 1

Skirting the Issue

Maulk

whether products are imported or locally produced."143 In addition, it would not
lead to linguistic depletion since only those words used generically in commerce
would be affected. Words that were generic but not used in commerce could still
be registered as trademarks or geographical indications in countries where they
were not generic.
A broader generic exclusion allows traditional producers to use their own
TCMs, reduces the likelihood of dilution of important cultural marks used
commercially, and furthers the stated objective of TRIPS: using IPRs "in a
manner conducive to social and economic welfare."1"
V. CONCLUSION
The attempted theft of the kikoi by a UK company is analogous to the
attempt of a Kenyan company to trademark the word "kilt." Not only would it
constitute a misappropriation of a cultural icon, but it would also divert
economic benefits from a tradition whose people have built up the reputation of
the item over years. This kind of theft has the possibility of confusing
consumers, increasing search costs, and reducing the incentives to producers of
continuing to produce the product and in a consistently high-quality fashion.
The fact that it is aimed at traditional knowledge frequently found in poor
countries makes it damaging to developing countries, especially given the
economic benefits traditional handicrafts have in the development of emerging
economies. Current and past international IP laws have failed to address
traditional knowledge and so the misappropriation of traditional knowledge has
continued with little obstruction. A growing movement to protect indigenous
goods, using both multilateral treaties and domestic laws, has begun to address
the problem, though with a limited scope. While a number of solutions have
been proposed, many of them are broad and unlikely to be adopted. Fortunately,
a narrower and more likely solution may exist in a generic exclusion for marks
that are used generically in commerce in any language.
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